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Abstract. Deep neural networks have lately shown tremendous per-
formance in various applications including vision and speech processing
tasks. However, alongside their ability to perform these tasks with such
high accuracy, it has been shown that they are highly susceptible to ad-
versarial attacks: a small change in the input would cause the network
to err with high confidence. This phenomenon exposes an inherent fault
in these networks and their ability to generalize well. For this reason,
providing robustness to adversarial attacks is an important challenge in
networks training, which has led to extensive research. In this work, we
suggest a theoretically inspired novel approach to improve the networks’
robustness. Our method applies regularization using the Frobenius norm
of the Jacobian of the network, which is applied as post-processing, after
regular training has finished. We demonstrate empirically that it leads
to enhanced robustness results with a minimal change in the original
network’s accuracy. 1
Keywords: Deep Learning, Neural Networks, Adversarial Examples,
Data Perturbation, Jacobian Regularization, Classification Robustness
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are a widespread machine learning technique,
which has shown state-of-the-art performance in many domains such as natural
language processing, computer vision and speech processing [1]. Alongside their
outstanding performance, deep neural networks have recently been shown to be
vulnerable to a specific kind of attacks, most commonly referred to as Adver-
sarial Attacks. These cause significant failures in the networks’ performance by
performing just minor changes in the input data that are barely noticeable by
a human observer and are not expected to change the prediction [2]. These at-
tacks pose a possible obstacle for mass deployment of systems relying on deep
learning in sensitive fields such as security or autonomous driving, and expose
an inherent weakness in their reliability.
1 The code is available at https://github.com/danieljakubovitz/Jacobian_
Regularization
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In adversarial attacks, very small perturbations in the network’s input data
are performed, which lead to classifying an input erroneously with a high con-
fidence. Even though these small changes in the input cause the model to err
with high probability, they are unnoticeable to the human eye in most cases. In
addition, it has been shown in [3] that such adversarial attacks tend to generalize
well across models. This transferability trait only increases the possible suscep-
tibility to attacks since an attacker might not need to know the structure of the
specific attacked network in order to fool it. Thus, black-box attacks are highly
successful as well. This inherent vulnerability of DNNs is somewhat counter in-
tuitive since it exposes a fault in the model’s ability to generalize well in very
particular cases.
Lately, this phenomenon has been the focus of substantial research, which
has focused on effective attack methods, defense methods and theoretical ex-
planations to this inherent vulnerability of the model. Attack methods aim to
alter the network’s input data in order to deliberately cause it to fail in its task.
Such methods include DeepFool [4], Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [2],
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [5], Universal Perturbations [6],
Adversarial Transformation Networks [7], and more [8].
Several defense methods have been suggested to increase deep neural net-
works’ robustness to adversarial attacks. Some of the strategies aim at detecting
whether an input image is adversarial or not (e.g., [9,10,11,12,13,14]). For exam-
ple, the authors in [12] suggested to detect adversarial examples using feature
squeezing, whereas the authors in [14] proposed to detect adversarial examples
based on density estimates and Bayesian uncertainty estimates. Other strategies
focus on making the network more robust to perturbed inputs. The latter, which
is the focus of this work, aims at increasing the network’s accuracy in perform-
ing its original task even when it is being fed with perturbed data, intended to
mislead it. This increased model robustness has been shown to be achieved by
several different methods.
These defense methods include, among others, Adversarial Training [2] which
adds perturbed inputs along with their correct labels to the training dataset; De-
fensive Distillation [15], which trains two networks, where the first is a standard
classification network and the second is trained to achieve an output similar to
the first network in all classes; the Batch Adjusted Network Gradients (BANG)
method [16], which balances gradients in the training batch by scaling up those
that have lower magnitudes; Parseval Networks [17] which constrain the Lip-
schitz constant of each hidden layer in a DNN to be smaller than 1; the En-
semble method [18], which takes the label that maximizes the average of the
output probabilities of the classifiers in the ensemble as the predicted label; a
Robust Optimization Framework [19], which uses an alternating minimization-
maximization procedure in which the loss of the network is minimized over per-
turbed examples that are generated at each parameter update; Virtual Adver-
sarial Training (VAT) [20], which uses a regularization term to promote the
smoothness of the model distribution; Input Gradient Regularization [21] which
regularizes the gradient of the cross-entropy loss, and Cross-Lipschitz Regular-
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ization [22], which regularizes all the combinations of differences of the gradients
of a network’s output w.r.t its input. In another recent work [23], the authors
suggested an adversarial training procedure that achieves robustness with guar-
antees on its statistical performance.
In addition to these works, several theoretical explanations for adversarial
examples have been suggested. In [2], the authors claim that linear behavior
in high-dimensional spaces creates this inherent vulnerability to adversarial ex-
amples. In [24], a game theoretical framework is used to study the relationship
between attack and defense strategies in recognition systems in the context of
adversarial attacks. In [25], the authors examine the transferability of adversar-
ial examples between different models and find that adversarial examples span a
contiguous subspace of large dimensionality. The authors also provide an insight
into the decision boundaries of DNNs. In [26], the authors claim that first order
attacks are universal and suggest the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack
which relies on this notion. They also claim that networks require a significantly
larger capacity in order to be more robust to adversarial attacks. In another
recent work [27], the authors show that the gradient of a network’s objective
function grows with the dimension of its input and conclude that the adversarial
vulnerability of a network increases with the dimension of its input.
In [28], the authors showed the relationship between a network’s sensitivity to
additive adversarial perturbations and the curvature of the classification bound-
aries. In addition, they propose a method to discriminate between the original
input and perturbed inputs. In [29], the link between a network’s robustness to
adversarial perturbations and the geometry of the decision boundaries of this
network is further developed. Specifically, it is shown that when the decision
boundary is positively curved, small universal perturbations are more likely to
fool the classifier. However, a direct application of this insight to increase the
networks’ robustness to adversarial examples is, to the best of our knowledge,
still unclear.
In a recent work [30], a relationship between the norm of the Jacobian of the
network and its generalization error has been drawn. The authors have shown
that by regularizing the Frobenius norm of the Jacobian matrix of the network’s
classification function, a lower generalization error is achieved. In [31] the authors
show that using the Jacobian matrix computed at the logits (before the softmax
operation) instead of the probabilities (after the softmax operation) yields better
generalization results.
Inspired by the work in [30], we take this notion further and show that using
Jacobian regularization as post-processing, i.e. applying it for a second phase of
additional training after regular training has finished, also increases deep neural
networks’ robustness to adversarial perturbations. Besides the relationship to
the generalization error, we show also that the Forbenius norm of the Jacobian
at a given point is related to its distance to the closest adversarial example
and to the curvature of the network’s decision boundaries. All these connections
provide a theoretical justification to the usage of the Jacobian regularization for
decreasing the vulnerability of a network to adversarial attacks.
4 D. Jakubovitz, R. Giryes
We apply the Jacobian regularization as post-processing to the regular train-
ing, after the network is stabilized with a high test accuracy, thereby allowing
to use our strategy with existing pre-trained networks and improve their robust-
ness. In addition, using the Jacobian regularization requires only little additional
computational resources as it makes a single additional back-propagation step in
each training step, as opposed to other methods that are very computationally
demanding such as Distillation [15] which requires the training of two networks.
Two close techniques to our strategy are the Input Gradient regularization
technique proposed in [21] and the Cross-Lipschitz regularization proposed in
[22]. Our approach differs from the former work by the fact that we regularize
the Frobenius norm of the Jacobian matrix of the network itself, and not the
norm of the gradient of the cross-entropy loss. Our work differs from the latter
work by the fact that we regularize the gradients of the network themselves and
not all combinations of their differences, which yields better results at a lower
computational cost, as will be later shown.
We compare the methods mentioned above and adversarial training [2] to
Jacobian regularization on the MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets,
demonstrating the advantage of our strategy in the form of high robustness to
the DeepFool [4], FGSM [2], and JSMA [5] attack methods. Our method sur-
passes the results of the other strategies on FGSM and DeepFool and achieves
competitive performance on JSMA. We also show that using Jacobian regu-
larization combined with adversarial training further improves the robustness
results.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Jacobian regu-
larization method and related strategies. Section 3 shows its connection to some
theory of adversarial examples. The relationships drawn in this section suggest
that regularizing the Jacobian of deep neural networks can improve their ro-
bustness to adversarial examples. In Section 4 we demonstrate empirically the
advantages of this approach. Section 5 concludes our paper. In the appendices
we provide more theoretical insight and additional experimental results.
2 Jacobian Regularization for Adversarial Robustness
Adversarial perturbations are essentially small changes in the input data which
cause large changes in the network’s output. In order to prevent this vulnerabil-
ity, during the post-processing training phase we penalize large gradients of the
classification function with respect to the input data. Thus, we encourage the
network’s learned function to be more robust to small changes in the input space.
This is achieved by adding a regularization term in the form of the Frobenius
norm of the network’s Jacobian matrix evaluated on the input data. The relation
between the Frobenius norm and the `2 (spectral) norm of the Jacobian matrix
has been shown in [30], and lays the justification for using the Frobenius norm
of the network’s Jacobian as a regularization term. We emphasize that we apply
this regularization as additional post-processing training which is done after the
regular training has finished.
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To describe the Jacobian regularization more formally, we use the following
notation. Let us denote the network’s input as a D-dimensional vector, its output
as a K-dimensional vector, and let us assume the training dataset X consists of
N training examples. We use the index l = 1, ..., L to specify a certain layer in a
network with L layers. z(l) is the output of the lth layer of the network and z
(l)
k
is the output of the kth neuron in this layer. In addition, let us denote by λ the
hyper-parameter which controls the weight of our regularization penalty in the
loss function. The input to the network is
xi ∈ RD, i = 1 . . . N, X =
 x
T
1
...
xTN
 ∈ RN×D, (1)
and its output is f(xi) ∈ RK , where the predicted class k∗i for an input xi is
k∗i = argmaxk fk(xi), k = 1, ...,K.
f(xi) = softmax{z(L)(xi)} is the network’s output after the softmax opera-
tion where z(L)(xi) is the output of the last fully connected layer in the network
for the input xi. The term ∇xz(L)(xi) is the Jacobian matrix of layer L eval-
uated at the point xi, i.e. J
(L)(xi) = ∇xz(L)(xi). Correspondingly, J (L)k (xi) =
∇xz(L)k (xi) is the kth row in the matrix J (L)(xi).
A network’s Jacobian matrix is given by
J(xi) , J (L)(xi) =

∂z
(L)
1 (xi)
∂x(1)
. . .
∂z
(L)
1 (xi)
∂x(D)
...
. . .
...
∂z
(L)
K (xi)
∂x(1)
. . .
∂z
(L)
K (xi)
∂x(D)
 ∈ RK×D, (2)
where x = (x(1) . . . x(D))
T . Accordingly, the Jacobian regularization term for an
input sample xi is
||J(xi)||2F =
D∑
d=1
K∑
k=1
(
∂
∂xd
z
(L)
k (xi)
)2
=
K∑
k=1
||∇xz(L)k (xi)||22. (3)
Combining the regularization term in (3) with a standard cross-entropy loss
function on the training data, we get the following loss function for training:
Loss = −
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
yik log fk(xi) + λ
√√√√ D∑
d=1
K∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
(
∂
∂xd
z
(L)
k (xi)
)2
, (4)
where yi ∈ RK is a one-hot vector representing the correct class of the input xi.
The Input Gradient regularization method from [21] uses the following reg-
ularization term:
D∑
d=1
N∑
i=1
(
∂
∂xd
K∑
k=1
−yik log fk(xi)
)2
. (5)
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The Cross-Lipschitz regularization method from [22] uses the following reg-
ularization term:
N∑
i=1
K∑
j,k=1
||∇xz(L)k (xi)−∇xz(L)j (xi)||22. (6)
The adversarial training method [2] adds perturbed inputs along with their
correct labels to the training dataset, so that the network learns the correct
labels of perturbed inputs during training. This helps the network to achieve a
higher accuracy when it is being fed with new perturbed inputs, meaning the
network becomes more robust to adversarial examples.
On the computational complexity aspect, Jacobian regularization introduces
an overhead of one additional back-propagation step in every iteration. This step
involves the computation of mixed partial derivatives, as the first derivative is
w.r.t the input, and the second is w.r.t. the model parameters. However, one
should keep in mind that Jacobian regularization is applied as a post-processing
phase, and not throughout the entire training, which is computationally bene-
ficial. Moreover, it is also more efficient than the Cross-Lipschitz regularization
technique [22], which requires the computation of the norm of 12K(K− 1) terms
as opposed to our method that only requires the calculation of the norm of K dif-
ferent gradients. This makes Jacobian regularization more scalable for datasets
with a large K.
3 Theoretical Justification
3.1 The Jacobian matrix and adversarial perturbations
In essence, for a network performing a classification task, an adversarial attack
(a fooling method) aims at making a change as small as possible, which changes
the network’s decision. In other words, finding the smallest perturbation that
causes the output function to cross a decision boundary to another class, thus
making a classification error. In general, an attack would seek for the closest
decision boundary to be reached by an adversarial perturbation in the input
space. This makes the attack the least noticeable and the least prone to being
discovered [2].
To gain some intuition for our proposed defense method, we start with a
simple informal explanation on the relationship between adversarial perturba-
tions and the Jacobian matrix of a network. Let x be a given input data sample;
xsame a data sample close to x from the same class that was not perturbed by
an adversarial attack; and xpert another data sample, which is the result of an
adversarial perturbation of x that keeps it close to it but with a different pre-
dicted label. Therefore, we have that for the `2 distance metric in the input and
output of the network
||xpert − x||2
||xsame − x||2 ≈ 1 and 1 <
||z(L)(xpert)− z(L)(x)||2
||z(L)(xsame)− z(L)(x)||2 , (7)
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with a high probability. Therefore,
||z(L)(xsame)− z(L)(x)||2
||xsame − x||2 <
||z(L)(xpert)− z(L)(x)||2
||xpert − x||2 . (8)
Let [x, xpert] be the D-dimensional line in the input space connecting x and
xpert. According to the mean value theorem there exists some x
′ ∈ [x, xpert]
such that
||z(L)(xpert)− z(L)(x)||22
||xpert − x||22
≤
K∑
k=1
||∇xz(L)k (x′)||22 = ||J(x′)||2F . (9)
This suggests that a lower Frobenius norm of the network’s Jacobian matrix
encourages it to be more robust to small changes in the input space. In other
words, the network is encouraged to yield similar outputs for similar inputs.
We empirically examined the average values of the Frobenius norm of the Ja-
cobian matrix of networks trained with various defense methods on the MNIST
dataset. The network architecture is described in Section 4. Table 1 presents
these values for both the original inputs and the ones which have been per-
turbed by DeepFool [4]. For “regular” training with no defense, it can be seen
that as predicted, the aforementioned average norm is significantly larger on per-
turbed inputs. Interestingly enough, using adversarial training, which does not
regularize the Jacobian matrix directly, decreases the average Frobenius norm
of the Jacobian matrix evaluated on perturbed inputs (second row of Table 1).
Yet, when Jacobian regularization is added (with λ = 0.1), this norm is reduced
much more (third and fourth rows of Table 1). Thus, it is expected to improve
the robustness of the network even further. Indeed, this behavior is demonstrated
in Section 4.
Table 1: Average Frobenius norm of the Jacobian matrix at the original data
and the data perturbed by DeepFool. DNN is trained on MNIST with various
defense methods.
Defense method 1N
N∑
i=1
||J(xi)||F 1N
N∑
i=1
||J(xipert )||F
No defense 0.14 0.1877
Adversarial Training 0.141 0.143
Jacobian regularization 0.0315 0.055
Jacobian regularization & Adversarial Training 0.0301 0.0545
3.2 Relation to classification decision boundaries
As shown in [4], we may locally treat the decision boundaries as hyper-surfaces in
the K-dimensional output space of the network. Let us denote g(x) = wTx+b =
0 as a hyper-plane tangent to such a decision boundary hyper-surface in the
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input space. Using this notion, the following lemma approximates the distance
between an input and a perturbed input classified to be at the boundary of a
hyper-surface separating between the class of x, k1, and another class k2.
Lemma 1 The first order approximation for the distance between an input x,
with class k1, and a perturbed input classified to the boundary hyper-surface
separating the classes k1 and k2 for an `2 distance metric is given by
d =
|z(L)k1 (x)− z
(L)
k2
(x)|
||∇xz(L)k1 (x)−∇xz
(L)
k2
(x)||2
. (10)
This lemma is given in [4]. For completeness, we present a short sketch of
the proof in Appendix A. Based on this lemma, the following corollary provides
a proxy for the minimal distance that may lead to fooling the network.
Corollary 2 Let k∗ be the correct class for the input sample x. Then the `2
norm of the minimal perturbation necessary to fool the classification function is
approximated by
d∗ = min
k 6=k∗
|z(L)k∗ (x)− z(L)k (x)|
||∇xz(L)k∗ (x)−∇xz(L)k (x)||2
. (11)
To make a direct connection to the Jacobian of the network, we provide the
following proposition:
Proposition 3 Let k∗ be the correct class for the input sample x. Then the first
order approximation for the `2 norm of the minimal perturbation necessary to
fool the classification function is lower bounded by
d∗ ≥ 1√
2||J (L)(x)||F
min
k 6=k∗
|z(L)k∗ (x)− z(L)k (x)|. (12)
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in Appendix B. The term |z(L)k∗ (x) −
z
(L)
k (x)| in (12) is maximized by the minimization of the cross-entropy term
of the loss function, since a DNN aspires to learn the correct output with the
largest confidence possible, meaning the largest possible margin in the output
space between the correct classification and the other possible classes. The term
||J (L)(x)||F in the denominator is the Frobenius norm of the Jacobian of the
last fully connected layer of the network. It is minimized due to the Jacobian
regularization part in the loss function. This is essentially a min-max problem,
since we wish to maximize the minimal distance necessary to fool the network, d∗.
For this reason, applying Jacobian regularization during training increases the
minimal distance necessary to fool the DNN, thus providing improved robustness
to adversarial perturbations. One should keep in mind that it is important not
to deteriorate the network’s original test accuracy. This is indeed the case as
shown in Section 4.
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An important question is whether the regularization of the Jacobian at earlier
layers of the network would yield better robustness to adversarial examples. To
this end, we examined imposing the regularization on the L − 1 and the L − 2
layers of the network. Both of these cases generally yielded degraded robustness
results compared to imposing the regularization on the last layer of the network.
Thus, throughout this work we regularize the Jacobian of the whole network. The
theoretical details are given in Appendix C and the corresponding experimental
results are given in Appendix D.
3.3 Relation to decision boundary curvature
In [29] the authors show the link between a network’s robustness to adversarial
perturbations and the geometry of its decision boundaries. The authors show
that when the decision boundaries are positively curved the network is fooled
by small universal perturbations with a higher probability. Here we show that
Jacobian regularization promotes the curvature of the decision boundaries to be
less positive, thus reducing the probability of the network being fooled by small
universal adversarial perturbations.
Let Hk(x) =
∂2z
(L)
k (x)
∂x2 be the Hessian matrix of the network’s classification
function at the input point x for the class k. As shown in [29], the decision
boundary between two classes k1 and k2 can be locally referred to as the hyper-
surface Fk1,k2(x) = z
(L)
k1
(x) − z(L)k2 (x) = 0. Relying on the work in [32] let us
use the approximation Hk(x) ≈ Jk(x)TJk(x) where Jk(x) is the kth row in the
matrix J(x). The matrix Jk(x)
TJk(x) is a rank one positive semi-definite matrix.
Thus, the curvature of the decision boundary Fk1,k2(x) is given by x
T (Hk1 −
Hk2)x, which using the aforementioned approximation, can be approximated by
xT
(
Jk1(x)
TJk1(x)− Jk2(x)TJk2(x)
)
x = (Jk1(x)x)
2 − (Jk2(x)x)2 . (13)
Thus, we arrive at the following upper bound for the curvature:
(Jk1(x)x)
2 − (Jk2(x)x)2 ≤ (Jk1(x)x)2 + (Jk2(x)x)2 (14)
≤
K∑
k=1
(Jk(x)x)
2 ≤ ||J(x)||2F ||x||22, (15)
where the last inequality stems from the matrix norm inequality. For this reason
the regularization of ||J(x)||F promotes a less positive curvature of the deci-
sion boundaries in the environment of the input samples. This offers a geomet-
ric intuition to the effect of Jacobian regularization on the network’s decision
boundaries. Discouraging a positive curvature makes a universal adversarial per-
turbation less likely to fool the classifier.
4 Experiments
We tested the performance of Jacobian regularization on the MNIST, CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100 datasets. The results for CIFAR-100, which are generally con-
sistent with the results for MNIST and CIFAR-10, are given in Appendix E.
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As mentioned before, we use the training with Jacobian regularization as a
post-processing phase to the ”regular” training. Using a post-processing train-
ing phase is highly beneficial: it has a low additional computational cost as we
add the regularization part after the network is already stabilized with a high
test accuracy and not throughout the entire training. It also allows taking an
existing network and applying the post-processing training phase to it in order
to increase its robustness to adversarial examples. We obtained optimal results
this way, whereas we found that applying the Jacobian regularization from the
beginning of the training yields a lower final test accuracy.
The improved test accuracy obtained using post-processing training can be
explained by the advantage of keeping the original training phase, which allows
the network to train solely for the purpose of a high test accuracy. The subse-
quent post-processing training phase with Jacobian regularization introduces a
small change to the already existing good test accuracy, as opposed to the case
where the regularization is applied from the beginning that results in a worse
test accuracy. Table 2 presents a comparison between post-processing training
and ”regular” training on MNIST. Similar results are obtained for CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100.
We examine the performance of our method using three different adversarial
attack methods: DeepFool [4], FGSM [2] and JSMA [5]. We also assess the per-
formance of our defense combined with adversarial training, which is shown to
be effective in improving the model’s robustness. However, this comes at the cost
of generating and training on a substantial amount of additional input samples
as is the practice in adversarial training. We found that the amount of per-
turbed inputs in the training mini-batch has an impact on the overall achieved
robustness. An evaluation of this matter appears in Appendix F. The results
for adversarial training, shown hereafter, are given for the amount of perturbed
inputs that yields the optimal results in each test case. We also compare the re-
sults to the Input Gradient regularization technique [21] and the Cross-Lipschitz
regularization technique [22].
Table 2: Effect of post-processing training vs. ”regular” training on MNIST,
using different defense methods
Defense method Test accuracy ρˆadv
No defense 99.08% 20.67 x 10−2
Input Gradient regularization, ”regular” training 99.25% 23.43 x 10−2
Input Gradient regularization, post-processing training 99.44% 24.03 x 10−2
Cross-Lipschitz regularization, ”regular” training 98.64% 29.03 x 10−2
Cross-Lipschitz regularization, post-processing training 98.91% 29.99 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization, ”regular” training 98.35% 32.89 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization, post-processing training 98.44% 34.24 x 10−2
For MNIST we used the network from the official TensorFlow tutorial [33].
The network consists of two convolutional layers, each followed by a max pool-
ing layer. These layers are then followed by two fully connected layers. All these
ECCV 2018 Conference Paper 11
layers use the ReLU activation function, except for the last layer which is fol-
lowed by a softmax operation. Dropout regularization with 0.5 keep probability
is applied to the fully connected layers. The training is done using an Adam op-
timizer [34] and a mini-batch size of 500 inputs. With this network we obtained
a test accuracy of 99.08%. Training with Jacobian regularization was done with
a weight of λ = 0.1, which we found to provide a good balance between the
cross-entropy loss and the Jacobian regularization.
For CIFAR-10 we used a convolutional neural network consisting of four
concatenated sets, where each set consists of two convolutional layers followed
by a max pooling layer followed by dropout with a 0.75 keep probability. After
these four sets, two fully connected layers are used. For CIFAR-10, training was
done with a RMSProp optimizer [35] and a mini-batch size of 128 inputs. With
this network we obtained a test accuracy of 88.79%. Training with Jacobian
regularization was done with a weight of λ = 0.5, which we found to provide a
good balance between the cross-entropy loss and the Jacobian regularization.
The results of an ablation study regarding the influence of variation in the
values of λ for MNIST and CIFAR-10 are given in Appendix G.
4.1 DeepFool evaluation
We start by evaluating the performance of our method compared to the others
under the DeepFool attack. The DeepFool attack [4] uses a first order approxi-
mation of the network’s decision boundaries as hyper-planes. Using this approx-
imation, the method seeks for the closest decision boundary to be reached by a
change in the input. Since the decision boundaries are not actually linear, this
process continues iteratively until the perturbed input changes the network’s de-
cision. The robustness metric associated with this attack is ρˆadv =
1
N
∑N
i=1
di
||xi||2 ,
which represents the average proportion between the `2 norm of the minimal per-
turbation necessary to fool the network for an input xi and the `2 norm of xi.
This attack is optimized for the `2 metric.
Table 3 and Table 4 present the robustness measured by ρˆadv under a Deep-
Fool attack for MNIST and CIFAR-10 respectively. As the results show, Jaco-
bian regularization provides a much more significant robustness improvement
compared to the other methods. Substantially smaller perturbation norms are
required to fool networks that use those defense approaches compared to net-
works that are trained using Jacobian regularization. Moreover, combining it
with adversarial training further enhances this difference in the results.
Notice that neither of the examined defense methods change the test accuracy
significantly. For MNIST, the Jacobian and Cross-Lipschitz regularizations and
adversarial training cause a small accuracy decrease, whereas the Input Gradient
regularization technique improves the accuracy. Conversely, for CIFAR-10, the
Jacobian and Cross-Lipschitz regularizations and adversarial training yield a
better accuracy, whereas the Input Gradient regularization reduces the accuracy.
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Table 3: Robustness to DeepFool attack for MNIST
Defense method Test accuracy ρˆadv
No defense 99.08% 20.67 x 10−2
Adversarial Training 99.03% 22.38 x 10−2
Input Gradient regularization 99.25% 23.43 x 10−2
Input Gradient regularization & Adversarial Training 98.88% 23.49 x 10−2
Cross-Lipschitz regularization 98.64% 29.03 x 10−2
Cross-Lipschitz regularization & Adversarial Training 98.73% 32.38 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization 98.44% 34.24 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization & Adversarial Training 98% 36.29 x 10−2
Table 4: Robustness to DeepFool attack for CIFAR-10
Defense method Test accuracy ρˆadv
No defense 88.79% 1.21 x 10−2
Adversarial Training 88.88% 1.23 x 10−2
Input Gradient regularization 88.56% 1.43 x 10−2
Input Gradient regularization & Adversarial Training 88.49% 2.17 x 10−2
Cross-Lipschitz regularization 88.91% 2.08 x 10−2
Cross-Lipschitz regularization & Adversarial Training 88.49% 4.04 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization 89.16% 3.42 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization & Adversarial Training 88.49% 6.03 x 10−2
4.2 FGSM evaluation
The FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method) attack [2] was designed to rapidly
create adversarial examples that could fool the network. The method changes
the network’s input according to:
xpert = x+  · sign (∇xLoss(x)) , (16)
where  represents the magnitude of the attack. This attack is optimized for the
`∞ metric.
We examined the discussed defense methods’ test accuracy under the FGSM
attack (test accuracy on the perturbed dataset) for different values of . Fig. 1
presents the results comparing Jacobian regularization to adversarial training,
Input Gradient regularization and Cross-Lipschitz regularization. In all cases,
the minimal test accuracy on the original test set using Jacobian regularization
is 98% for MNIST and 88.49% for CIFAR-10.
Similarly to the results under the DeepFool attack, the results under the
FGSM attack show that the test accuracy with the Jacobian regularization de-
fense is higher than with the Input Gradient and Cross-Lipschitz regulariza-
tions or with adversarial training. Moreover, if adversarial training is combined
with Jacobian regularization, its advantage over using the other techniques is
even more distinct. This leads to the conclusion that the Jacobian regularization
method yields a more robust network to the FGSM attack.
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(a) MNIST (b) CIFAR-10
Fig. 1: Test accuracy for FGSM attack on MNIST (left) and CIFAR-10 (right)
for different values of 
4.3 JSMA evaluation
The JSMA (Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack) [5] attack relies on the com-
putation of a Saliency Map, which outlines the impact of every input pixel on
the classification decision. The method picks at every iteration the most influen-
tial pixel to be changed such that the likelihood of the target class is increased.
We leave the mathematical details to the original paper. Similarly to FGSM, 
represents the magnitude of the attack. The attack is repeated iteratively, and
is optimized for the `0 metric.
We examined the defense methods’ test accuracy under the JSMA attack
(test accuracy on the perturbed dataset) for different values of . Fig. 2 presents
the results for the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. The parameters of the JSMA
attack are 80 epochs, 1 pixel attack for the former and 200 epochs, 1 pixel attack,
for the latter. In all cases, the minimal test accuracy on the original test set using
Jacobian regularization is 98% for MNIST and 88.49% for CIFAR-10.
(a) MNIST (b) CIFAR-10
Fig. 2: Test accuracy for JSMA (1 pixel) attack on MNIST with 80 epochs (left)
and CIFAR-10 with 200 epochs (right) for different values of 
Our method achieves superior results compared to the other three methods
on CIFAR-10. On the other hand, on MNIST we obtain an inferior performance
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compared to the Input Gradient regularization method, though we obtain a bet-
ter performance compared to Cross-Lipschitz regularization. Thus, we conclude
that our defense method is effective under the JSMA attack in some cases and
presents competitive performance overall. We believe that the reason behind the
failure of our method in the MNIST case can be explained by our theoretical
analysis. In the formulation of the Jacobian regularization (based on the Frobe-
nius norm of the Jacobian matrix), the metric that is being minimized is the `2
norm. Yet, in the JSMA attack, the metric that is being targeted by the pertur-
bation is the `0 pseudo-norm as only one pixel is being changed in every epoch.
We provide more details on this issue in Appendix H.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper introduced the Jacobian regularization method for improving DNNs’
robustness to adversarial examples. We provided a theoretical foundation for its
usage and showed that it yields a high degree of robustness, whilst preserving
the network’s test accuracy. We demonstrated its improvement in reducing the
vulnerability to various adversarial attacks (DeepFool, FGSM and JSMA) on the
MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets. Under all three examined attack
methods Jacobian regularization exhibits a large improvement in the network’s
robustness to adversarial examples, while only slightly changing the network’s
performance on the original test set. Moreover, in general, Jacobian regular-
ization without adversarial training is better than adversarial training without
Jacobian regularization, whereas the combination of the two defense methods
provides even better results. Compared to the Input Gradient regularization,
our proposed approach achieves superior performance under two out of the three
attacks and competitive ones on the third (JSMA). Compared to the Cross-
Lipschitz regularization, our proposed approach achieves superior performance
under all of the three examined attacks.
We believe that our approach, with its theoretical justification, may open the
door to other novel strategies for defense against adversarial attacks.
In the current form of regularization of the Jacobian, its norm is evaluated at
the input samples. We empirically deduced that the optimal results are obtained
by applying the Jacobian regularization on the original input samples, which is
also more efficient computationally, and not on perturbed input samples or on
points in the input space for which the Frobenius norm of the Jacobian matrix
is maximal. A future work may analyze the reasons for that.
Notice that in the Frobenius norm, all the rows of the Jacobian matrix are
penalized equally. Another possible future research direction is providing a differ-
ent weight for each row. This may be achieved by either using a weighted version
of the Frobenius norm or by replacing it with other norms such as the spectral
one. Note, though, that the latter option is more computationally demanding
compared to our proposed approach.
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Appendix
A Proof Sketch of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 The first order approximation for the distance between an input x,
with class k1, and a perturbed input classified to the boundary hyper-surface
separating the classes k1 and k2 for an `2 distance metric is given by
d =
|z(L)k1 (x)− z
(L)
k2
(x)|
||∇xz(L)k1 (x)−∇xz
(L)
k2
(x)||2
. (17)
Proof Sketch. Let g(x) = wTx + b = 0 be a hyper-plane tangent to a decision
boundary hyper-surface separating between two classes k1 and k2 in the input
space. Let the point of tangency be x0 such that g(x0) = w
Tx0 + b = 0. The
distance between a point x and the hyper-plane g(x) is given by
d =
|wT (x− x0)|
||w||2 =
|wTx+ b|
||w||2 =
|g(x)|
||w||2 =
|g(x)|
||∇xg(x)||2 . (18)
Since g(x0) is on the boundary hyper-surface between the classes k1 and k2 it
holds that
g(x0) = z
(L)
k1
(x0)− z(L)k2 (x0) = 0. (19)
For a point x, which is in the environment of x0
g(x) ≈ z(L)k1 (x)− z
(L)
k2
(x). (20)
From (18) and (20) it follows that the first order approximation of the distance
(for the `2 metric) between an input x, with class k1, and a perturbed input
classified to the boundary hyper-surface separating the classes k1 and k2 is given
by (17). uunionsq
B Proof of Proposition 3
We reiterate Corollary 2 and Proposition 3 before proving the latter.
Corollary 2 Let k∗ be the correct class for the input sample x. Then the `2
norm of the minimal perturbation necessary to fool the classification function is
approximated by
d∗ = min
k 6=k∗
|z(L)k∗ (x)− z(L)k (x)|
||∇xz(L)k∗ (x)−∇xz(L)k (x)||2
. (21)
Proposition 3 makes a direct connection to the Jacobian of the network.
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Proposition 3 Let k∗ be the correct class for the input sample x. Then the first
order approximation for the `2 norm of the minimal perturbation necessary to
fool the classification function is lower bounded by
d∗ ≥ 1√
2||J (L)(x)||F
min
k 6=k∗
|z(L)k∗ (x)− z(L)k (x)|. (22)
Proof. Relying on Corollary 2 we get that
d∗
2
= min
k 6=k∗
|z(L)k∗ (x)− z(L)k (x)|2
||∇xz(L)k∗ (x)−∇xz(L)k (x)||22
= min
k 6=k∗
|z(L)k∗ (x)− z(L)k (x)|2
||J (L)k∗ (x)− J (L)k (x)||22
(23)
= min
k 6=k∗
|z(L)k∗ (x)− z(L)k (x)|2
||J (L)k∗ (x)||22 − 2J (L)k∗ (x)J (L)k (x)T + ||J (L)k (x)||22
(24)
≥ min
k 6=k∗
|z(L)k∗ (x)− z(L)k (x)|2
2
(
||J (L)k∗ (x)||22 + ||J (L)k (x)||22
) . (25)
Since
∑K
k=1 ||J (L)k (x)||22 = ||J (L)(x)||2F we get that
d∗
2 ≥ 1
2||J (L)(x)||2F
min
k 6=k∗
|z(L)k∗ (x)− z(L)k (x)|2, (26)
and accordingly,
d∗ ≥ 1√
2||J (L)(x)||F
min
k 6=k∗
|z(L)k∗ (x)− z(L)k (x)| (27)
as stipulated. uunionsq
C Jacobian regularization of the network’s L− 1 layer -
Mathematical Analysis
To provide a bound for the L − 1 layer of the network, we rely on the work
in [36], which shows that fixating the weight matrix of the last fully connected
layer in a deep neural network causes little to no loss of accuracy while allowing
memory and computational benefits. Assuming that this layer corresponds to a
weight matrix with K orthonormal columns, it is possible to take another path
in the proof of Proposition 3 and obtain a bound as a function of the Jacobian of
the L−1 layer of the network. This bound is exactly as (22), but with J (L−1)(x)
instead of J (L)(x), as formulated in Proposition 4 hereafter. Note that a trivial
application of the multiplicative matrix norm inequality on (22) leads to a bound
with a factor of
√
K in the denominator since
||J (L)(x)||F = ||W (L)T J (L−1)(x)||F ≤ ||W (L)T ||F ||J (L−1)(x)||F (28)
=
√
K||J (L−1)(x)||F , (29)
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where the last equality stems from the fact that ||W (L)||2F = K for an orthonor-
mal W (L) with K columns.
Given that we have two similar bounds, one depending on the Jacobian of
the whole network and one on the Jacobian of the L − 1 layer, it is important
to ask which of them should we regularize to render better robustness to the
network. The experimental results for the regularization of the Jacobian of the
L − 1 layer of the network, with and without a fixed W (L) with orthonormal
columns, are given in Appendix D. In this section and the following we use the
following additional notation:
– The network’s L−1 layer is a fully connected layer consisting of M neurons.
We use the index m = 1, ...,M for a specific neuron in this layer.
– J (L−1)(x) = ∇xz(L−1)(x) =

∇xz(L−1)1 (x)
...
∇xz(L−1)M (x)
 ∈ RM×D is the Jacobian ma-
trix of layer L − 1 of the network with respect to its input x, J (L−1)m (x) =
∇xz(L−1)m (x) is the mth row in this matrix.
– We assume that no activation or other non-linear function is applied before
the softmax. Thus, the relationship between the L − 1 layer and the last
layer of the network is as follows: z(L) = W (L)
T
z(L−1)+b(L), W (L) ∈ RM×K ,
b(L) ∈ RK×1, where W (L)k is the kth column in the matrix and k = 1, ...,K.
We introduce the following proposition to lay the theoretical foundation for
the regularization of the Jacobian matrix of the L− 1 layer of the network.
Proposition 4 Let k∗ be the correct class for the input sample x and let W (L),
the weight matrix of the last fully connected layer in the network, have K or-
thonormal columns. Then, the first order approximation for d∗, the `2-norm of
the minimal perturbation necessary to fool the classification function, is lower
bounded as
d∗ ≥ 1√
2||J (L−1)(x)||F
min
k 6=k∗
|z(L)k∗ (x)− z(L)k (x)|. (30)
Proof. Since the weight matrix W (L) has K orthonormal columns, then for any
k1 6= k2 it holds thatW (L)
T
k1
W
(L)
k2
= 0 and for any k it holds thatW
(L)T
k W
(L)
k = 1.
We remind the reader that according to Lemma 1, the first order approxi-
mation for the `2 distance between an input x, with class k1, and a perturbed
input classified to the boundary hyper-surface separating the classes k1 and k2
is given by
d =
|z(L)k1 (x)− z
(L)
k2
(x)|
||∇xz(L)k1 (x)−∇xz
(L)
k2
(x)||2
. (31)
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Developing this equality further using the chain rule, we have
d =
|z(L)k1 (x)− z
(L)
k2
(x)|
||∑Mm=1 ∂z(L)k1 (x)∂z(L−1)m ∂z(L−1)m∂x −∑Mm=1 ∂z(L)k2 (x)∂z(L−1)m ∂z(L−1)m∂x ||2
(32)
=
|z(L)k1 (x)− z
(L)
k2
(x)|
||∑Mm=1 (W (L)m,k1 −W (L)m,k2)∇xz(L−1)m (x)||2 (33)
=
|z(L)k1 (x)− z
(L)
k2
(x)|
||(W (L)Tk1 −W
(L)T
k2
)J (L−1)(x)||2
≥ |z
(L)
k1
(x)− z(L)k2 (x)|
||J (L−1)(x)||F ||W (L)k1 −W (L)k2 ||2
, (34)
where the last inequality stems from the multiplicative matrix norm inequality.
Since the columns of W (L) are orthonormal it holds that
||W (L)k1 −W
(L)
k2
||22 = ||W (L)k1 ||22 + ||W
(L)
k2
||22 = 2. (35)
Plugging (35) in (34) leads to
d ≥ |z
(L)
k1
(x)− z(L)k2 (x)|√
2||J (L−1)(x)||F
. (36)
Let k∗ be the correct class for the input sample x. Then, the first order
approximation for the `2-norm of the minimal perturbation necessary to fool
the network is exactly as lower bounded in (30). uunionsq
D Jacobian regularization of the network’s L − 1 and
L− 2 layers - Experiments
In this section we show the empirical results of a regularization based on the
Frobenius norm of the Jacobian matrix of the L − 1 and L − 2 layers of the
network (J (L−1)(x) and J (L−2)(x) respectively).
Since the L − 1 layer typically consists of substantially more neurons than
the last layer, i.e. M  K, the evaluation of the Jacobian matrix of the L − 1
layer is much more computationally demanding. For example, in our network for
MNIST classification, M = 1024 K = 10. Accordingly, when regularizing the
Jacobian matrix of the L−1 layer we reduced the size of the training mini-batch
to 50 inputs per mini-batch due to computational constraints.
This increase in the computational overhead required for the regularization
of the Jacobian of the network’s L−1 layer is a significant factor in our decision
to prefer the regularization of the last layer of the Jacobian matrix. Our choice
of the last layer is further supported by the fact that it also leads to superior
results under most attack methods compared to the regularization of the L− 1
layer as we show hereafter.
We examine two cases: a case in which the weight matrix W (L) is fixed
with K orthonormal columns (i.e. not updated during training), and a case in
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which no restriction is imposed on W (L) and it is updated during training. For
comparison, Table 5 (same as Table 3) presents the results achieved for MNIST
under the DeepFool attack with the regularization of the Frobenius norm of the
Jacobian of the last layer of the network.
Table 5: Robustness to DeepFool attack for MNIST, regularization based on the
Jacobian of the last layer
Defense method Test accuracy ρˆadv
No defense 99.08% 20.67 x 10−2
Adversarial Training 99.03% 22.38 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization 98.44% 34.24 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization & Adversarial Training 98% 36.29 x 10−2
Table 6: Robustness to DeepFool attack for MNIST – regularization of J (L−1)(x),
with a fixed W (L) with K orthonormal columns
Defense method Test accuracy ρˆadv
No defense 98.23% 20.18 x 10−2
Adversarial Training 98.06% 24.20 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization 97.10% 29.61 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization & Adversarial Training 96.67% 31.06 x 10−2
Table 7: Robustness to DeepFool attack for MNIST – regularization of J (L−1)(x),
W (L) updated during training
Defense method Test accuracy ρˆadv
No defense 99.08% 20.67 x 10−2
Adversarial Training 99.03% 22.38 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization 98.75% 28.16 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization & Adversarial Training 98.54% 32.02 x 10−2
Tables 6 and 7 present the results for MNIST under the DeepFool attack
with a regularization based on the Frobenius norm of the Jacobian of the L− 1
layer of the network J (L−1)(x). Table 6 considers the case where the last layer of
the network has a fixed weight matrix W (L) with K orthonormal columns and
Table 7 demonstrates the scenario where the weight matrix W (L) is updated
during training.
Note that regularizing the Jacobian of the last layer of the network is sig-
nificantly better compared to the cases where the L − 1 layer is regularized. In
addition, it is interesting to remark that when W (L) is updated during training,
the test accuracy on the original dataset is higher compared to the case in which
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W (L) is fixed. Yet, the robustness results under the DeepFool attack are similar
in both cases.
(a) FGSM attack (b) JSMA attack
Fig. 3: MNIST test accuracy under FGSM (left) and JSMA (right) attacks for
different values of  for Jacobian regularization of layer L; Jacobian regularization
of layer L − 1 with W (L) fixed with K orthonormal columns; and Jacobian
regularization of layer L− 1 with W (L) updated during training
Comparisons of the test accuracies under the FGSM and JSMA attack meth-
ods are presented in Fig. 3. The JSMA attack was performed as a 1 pixel attack
with 80 epochs.
Note that under the JSMA attack, the regularization of the network’s L− 1
layer yields better results, whereas under the FGSM attack the regularization of
the last layer of the network yields better results. Maintaining the weight matrix
W (L) constant with K orthonormal columns generally harms the robustness
results in the former case and improves the robustness results in the latter case.
For completeness, we also examined the case where Jacobian regularization
is applied to the L− 2 layer of the network, i.e. regularizing the Frobenius norm
of J (L−2)(x), both with W (L) and W (L−1) updated during training and with
W (L) and W (L−1) fixed with K and M orthonormal columns respectively. This
case is even more computationally demanding, e.g. in the case of MNIST our
network’s L− 2 layer consists of 3136 neurons. The empirical results under the
DeepFool attack are given in Table 8 and Table 9.
Table 8: Robustness to DeepFool attack for MNIST – regularization of J (L−2)(x),
with fixed W (L) and W (L−1) with K and M orthonormal columns respectively
Defense method Test accuracy ρˆadv
No defense 95.45% 17.60 x 10−2
Adversarial Training 95.26% 20.83 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization 94.86% 22.52 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization & Adversarial Training 94.50% 24.21 x 10−2
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Table 9: Robustness to DeepFool attack for MNIST – regularization of J (L−2)(x),
W (L) and W (L−1) updated during training
Defense method Test accuracy ρˆadv
No defense 99.08% 20.67 x 10−2
Adversarial Training 99.03% 22.38 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization 98.51% 23.19 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization & Adversarial Training 98.14% 25.41 x 10−2
As can be seen in the results, the obtained robustness is significantly lower
when Jacobian regularization is applied to the L− 2 layer of the network, com-
pared to the L − 1 layer and the last layer. The results show that Jacobian
regularization becomes less effective when it is applied to earlier layers of the
network. In the case where W (L) and W (L−1) are updated during training, this
can be explained by the network’s increased ability to compensate for this reg-
ularization using the weights of the last layers, which are not subject to the
regularization. When W (L) and W (L−1) are fixed, the regularization is less able
to force the network’s weights towards obtaining robustness, and at the same
time the network is less able to perform its classification task with a good test ac-
curacy. In addition, as typically the size of the last layers of the network becomes
smaller and smaller towards the last layer (consisting of less neurons), applying
Jacobian regularization on earlier layers is significantly more computationally
demanding.
E Experimental results for the CIFAR-100 dataset
For CIFAR-100 we used the exact same network as for CIFAR-10. As CIFAR-
100 is a more computationally demanding dataset (K = 100), training was
done with a mini-batch size of 96 inputs. With this network we obtained a
test accuracy of 59.64%. Training with Jacobian regularization was done with a
weight of λ = 0.02, which we found to provide a good balance between the cross-
entropy loss and the Jacobian regularization. We found that the Cross-Lipschitz
regularization is not scalable to large values of K (unreasonable runtime), and
it is therefore not included in the results. Table 10 presents the results for the
DeepFool attack. Fig. 4 shows the results for the FGSM and JSMA attacks.
Table 10: Robustness to DeepFool attack for CIFAR-100
Defense method Test accuracy ρˆadv
No defense 59.64% 0.61 x 10−2
Adversarial Training 60.67% 1.23 x 10−2
Input Gradient regularization 62.55% 0.76 x 10−2
Input Gradient regularization & Adversarial Training 60.66% 1.45 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization 59.20% 1.55 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization & Adversarial Training 60.38% 3.34 x 10−2
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(a) FGSM attack (b) JSMA attack
Fig. 4: CIFAR-100 test accuracy under FGSM (left) and JSMA (right) attacks
for different values of 
Interestingly, adversarial training yields good robustness results under the
FGSM and JSMA attacks for small magnitude attacks (small values of ), yet
for stronger attacks adversarial training actually harms the network’s robustness.
F Influence of the amount of adversarial examples in the
training mini-batch
In this section, we analyze the effect of the amount of adversarial examples
used in training on the robustness of the network. We found that incorporating
different amounts of adversarial examples in the training mini-batch can lead to
very different final network robustness results. Adding more perturbed inputs
to the training set does not necessarily increase the network’s robustness. The
experiments depicted hereafter are done on the MNIST dataset, with the same
network as described in the main paper and with the same mini-batch size of 500
inputs. We evaluate various proportions between the number of original training
examples and the number of perturbed adversarial examples. All the perturbed
inputs were generated using the DeepFool attack method.
Table 11: Robustness to DeepFool attack for MNIST with adversarial training,
with different percentages of perturbed examples in a training mini-batch of 500
inputs
Defense method Test accuracy ρˆadv
No defense 99.08% 20.67 x 10−2
Adversarial training, 10% perturbed 98.99% 23.73 x 10−2
Adversarial training, 20% perturbed 98.8% 22.29 x 10−2
Adversarial training, 30% perturbed 98.91% 20.71 x 10−2
Adversarial training, 40% perturbed 98.96% 19.53 x 10−2
Adversarial training, 50% perturbed 98.72% 18.74 x 10−2
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Table 12: Robustness to DeepFool attack for MNIST with Jacobian regulariza-
tion (λ = 0.1) and adversarial training, with different percentages of perturbed
examples in a training mini-batch of 500 inputs
Defense method Test accuracy ρˆadv
Jacobian regularization & no adversarial training 98.44% 34.24 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization & adversarial training 10% perturbed 98.06% 35.57 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization & adversarial training 20% perturbed 97.92% 37.14 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization & adversarial training 30% perturbed 98.07% 34.32 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization & adversarial training 40% perturbed 97.87% 34.43 x 10−2
Jacobian regularization & adversarial training 50% perturbed 98.03% 36.89 x 10−2
The results are examined under the DeepFool attack and evaluated using
the ρˆadv metric. Table 11 presents the results without any defense except ad-
versarial training. Table 12 shows the results with both adversarial training and
Jacobian regularization. The results suggest that using more perturbed inputs
in the training mini-batch does not necessarily improve the final robustness to
adversarial attacks, but rather there is specific balance for which optimal ro-
bustness is achieved. It can also be observed that this balance changes with the
addition of the Jacobian regularization to the adversarial training.
G Jacobian regularization - influence of the
hyper-parameter λ
The influence of variation in the value of the hyper-parameter λ, which balances
the cross-entropy loss and the Jacobian regularization, is given in Table 13 for
MNIST and Table 14 for CIFAR-10.
For MNIST, the obtained robustness is higher as the value of λ increases,
with a slight degradation in the test accuracy, up to the value of λ = 0.1. For
λ > 0.1, the obtained robustness declines along with a substantial degradation
in the test accuracy.
Table 13: Influence of λ on Jacobian regularization for MNIST. The chosen value
is in bold.
λ Test accuracy ρˆadv
0 99.08% 20.67 x 10−2
0.001 99.00% 22.21 x 10−2
0.005 98.96% 23.99 x 10−2
0.01 98.97% 26.34 x 10−2
0.02 98.76% 28.93 x 10−2
0.05 98.62% 32.39 x 10−2
0.1 98.44% 34.24 x 10−2
0.2 97.88% 34.18 x 10−2
0.5 96.92% 33.51 x 10−2
1 95.24% 33.48 x 10−2
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Table 14: Influence of λ on Jacobian regularization for CIFAR-10. The chosen
value is in bold.
λ Test accuracy ρˆadv
0 88.79% 1.21 x 10−2
0.001 88.69% 1.45 x 10−2
0.005 88.65% 1.74 x 10−2
0.01 88.76% 1.80 x 10−2
0.05 88.73% 2.44 x 10−2
0.1 89.16% 2.69 x 10−2
0.5 89.16% 3.42 x 10−2
1 87.82% 4.08 x 10−2
2 86.30% 4.83 x 10−2
5 81.46% 4.60 x 10−2
Unlike MNIST, for CIFAR-10 there is a slight improvement in the test accu-
racy when Jacobian regularization is applied, even though for too large values
of λ the test accuracy deteriorates as well.
H Jacobian regularization and the JSMA attack
While our proposed Jacobian regularization outperforms all the other defense
methods considered in the paper (adversarial training, Input Gradient regular-
ization and Cross-Lipschitz regularization) under the DeepFool and the FGSM
attacks, it gets inferior performance compared to the Input Gradient regulariza-
tion technique for the JSMA attack on the MNIST dataset (for CIFAR-10 it is
better). Here we provide a possible explanation for the reason that regularizing
the Frobenius norm of the Jacobian does not perform as well for this type of
attack.
We start by a short description of the JSMA attack algorithm. This attack
targets the `0 pseudo-norm of the input image. According to a saliency map, one
pixel in the input image is changed in every epoch. This pixel is chosen such that
the change in the classification output is maximal towards the choice of another
target class. This attack is effective in minimizing visual detectability since a
change in a small amount of pixels is less likely to be noticed by the human eye.
To better understand the reason behind the failure of our method we rely on
the mathematical analysis provided in the main paper. This analysis shows that
the Jacobian regularization defense, based on the regularization of the Frobenius
norm, aims at maximizing the minimal `2 distance between the original input
and a perturbed version of that input that would cause a misclassification. This
provides an explanation to the behavior that we see under JSMA, as the JSMA
attack changes a minimal amount of pixels and the Jacobian regularization aims
at maximizing the `2 distance.
Better robustness to the JSMA attack would be achieved by maximizing
the `0 distance to adversarial examples with the minimal `0 distance from the
original input, which is a different goal than maximizing the `2 distance. As we
shall see now, these two goals are not necessarily aligned. Let us assume that
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n pixels are changed in the input image, each changed by a value of A. The
`0 pseudo-norm distance between the original image and the perturbed version
is n, as only n pixels were changed. However, the `2 distance between the two
is
√
nA2 =
√
n|A|. For this reason, an `2-based defense method penalizes large
values of |A| much more than large values of n, whereas an `0 attack disregards
the value of |A| and only aims at minimizing n.
From this we draw the conclusion that an `2-based defense is more effective
against attacks that make small changes to a large number of pixels such as
DeepFool or FGSM, than against attacks that make large changes to a small
amount of pixels, which is the case of the JSMA attack.
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